Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Prelude to the Civil War by Jackson, Faith Joseph
Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 3
1-1-2011
Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Prelude to the Civil War
Faith Joseph Jackson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Legal History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Faith J. Jackson, Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Prelude to the Civil War, 15 Rich. J.L. & Pub. Int. 377 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/3
DRED SCOTT V SANDFORD: A PRELUDE TO THE CIVIL WAR
Faith Joseph Jackson
I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred and fifty years after the end of the Civil War,
historians have yet to wholly reconcile the dueling narratives of the
War's cause, meaning, and repercussions.' Those still fighting the
South's cause claim it was mainly a dispute addressing states' rights.2
Others believe this argument to be a mask designed to sublimate sla-
very's role as the foremost reason for Southern secession. 3 Perhaps
equally as important as slavery's cultural and economic implications
are its pre and post-Civil War legislative and judicial consequences.
Notably, the Dred Scott4 case provides both a textual source to ex-
amine the societal, political, and legal turmoil surrounding this issue,
and a tangible historical moment at which the War became an inevi-
tability.5  Though it remains a tarnish on the institution of our high-
est court, the Dred Scott case may have been a necessary evil on the
route to ending the deeply entrenched establishment of slavery in this
country. 6
Faith Joseph Jackson is an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Southern University-
Thurgood Marshall School of Law. She teaches contract law and administrative law courses,
including legislation and advanced constitutional law.
1 James W. Loewen, Five Myths about Why the South Seceded, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/outlooldfive-myths-about-why-the-south-
seceded/2011/01/03/ABHr6jDstory.html.
2 Paul Finkelman, An Inescapable Conflict: The End of War and Slavery Yields a New Racial
Order, A.B.A. J.. April 2011, at 45.
See Loewen. supra note 1.
4 See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
See generally Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 Cm.-KENT L. REv.
97 (2007).
6 See generally id
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On an anniversary of the Civil War,7 it may be instructive to
remember the decision and its place in the events that led the United
States into war against itself. The Dred Scott case questioned wheth-
er Blacks were or could ever be citizens of the United States. Scott
navigated the legal system for over a decade before losing his case,
though he won his freedom a few short months after the decision, as
Emerson's widow had married an abolitionist. 9 The ramifications of
this decision-what may be the most notorious opinion drafted by the
Supreme Court-would be systemic and far-reaching.10 In addition
to declaring that Blacks could not be citizens, the Court's decision
would also declare the Missouri Compromise of 182011 unconstitu-
tional. Abolitionists viewed the decision as open advocacy of slavery
by the Supreme Court,12 as it frustrated any restrictions Congress
might have placed on the growth of slavery. 13
This article will first review the foundational cracks that sla-
very left in the creation of the United States' Constitution. It will
then examine the ensuing legislative efforts to contend with the polit-
ical and societal consequences of the slavery divide. Next, it will dis-
cuss the history behind the Scott case, and the course and resolution
of the case in the court system. It will then describe the notoriety of
the case and the impact it had on the events leading up to the war. It
will conclude with an analysis of Dred Scott's position at the locus of
only real conflict that caused the war: the geopolitical strife between
the agrarian, slaveholding South, and the industrialized North.
7 Jay Clarke, Civil War's 150th Anniversary: Commemorations, Note Celebrations in Re-
membering the Country's Deadliest War, CLEVELAND.COM, (Apr. 2. 2011. 5:10 PM),
http://blog.cleveland.com/travelimpact/print.html?entry=/2011/04/civil-
wars 150th-anniversary c.html.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403 ("The question is simply this: can a negro, whose an-
cestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves, become a member of the political
community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and
as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that
instrument to the citizen?").
9 Id. at 182.
'0 ROBERT F. CUSHMAN & SusAN P. KONIAK. CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126 (8th ed.
1994).
1 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452.
12 EBONY, PICTORIAL HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA AFRICAN PAST TO CIVIL WAR 237
(1971).
WILLIAM LOREN KATZ. MINORITIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY. SLAVERY TO CIVIL WAR 1812-
1865 75 (1974).
2
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II. SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article I of the Constitution addresses Congress's construc-
tion and powers. Article I, section 2 specifically speaks to the appor-
tioning of representatives and taxes for the thirteen states that were
currently in the Union. 14 The Constitution's authors created a formu-
la to determine the number of representatives appointed to each state
based on the "number of free persons,"' 5 and, "three fifths of all other
person," or slaves.16 Though this calculus considered slaves for the
purposes of state representation, the slaves themselves had no vote. 17
This gave any state that recognized slavery greater political represen-
tation in the national legislature. Because "cotton was king" in the
South, Southern states were the primary beneficiaries of the three-
fifths clause. 19 While Northern states became industrialized, slavery
was the source of southern wealth. 20 As the Union expanded, adding
new states, Northerners did not like the advantage afforded to the
southern states who wanted to preserve "human bondage" 21 and who
would reap both political representation and economic power from it,
while spreading the Southern influence to the West.22
The three fifths clause was not the only means by which the
founders established slavery as a part of their new government. Ar-
ticle IV, Section II, provided that "No Person held to Service or La-
bour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another,
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. cl. 3.
15 Id.
16 See id. (During the year of 1787, in Philadelphia, the site of the first Constitutional Con-
vention, the framers of the Constitution made a political compromise. The compromise ef-
fectively provided national sanction to the inferior status of slaves by setting their political
weight at three-fifths of that of whites); EBONY, supra note 12, at 87.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.3. During the post-Civil War years from 1865 to 1869, Congress
and the states passed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth. and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion. The Thirteenth Amendment made slavery illegal in the United States: the Fourteenth
Amendment recognized former slaves as citizens of the United States: and the Fifteenth
Amendment addressed the right of citizens of the United States to vote regardless of race.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV.
1 See Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545 (1820).
19 KATZ, supra note 13, at 3 (The invention of the cotton gin in 1793 fastened slavery secure-
ly in the South. The production of cotton fabric was now more affordable, which resulted in
an intercontinental demand. As the demand for cotton rose, the demand for more slaves fol-
lowed suit).
20 Id.
2 Finkelman, supra note 2, at 45.
22 KATZ, supra note 13, at 1.
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shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be dis-
charged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due." 23
This passage, known as the fugitive slave clause, required even states
that chose to reject slavery within their borders to honor it when slave
owners came looking for escaped slaves.24 Finally, Article I also
prevented Congress from ending the Atlantic slave trade for twenty
years after the Constitution's signing. 25
III. CONGRESSIONAL AGREEMENTS: REGULATING TERRITORY EXPANSION
AND THE EXTENSION OF SLAVERY
In an effort to preserve the political balance between the slave
states and free states in the Union, Congress passed legislation to ad-
dress the issue of slavery.26 As the Union expanded, slavery suppor-
ters and abolitionists made agreements addressing the regulation of
slavery.27 However, the Scott ruling would render these congressional
restrictions on slavery's growth unconstitutional.28
A. Northwest Ordinance
Following the Revolutionary War, a tract of land lying north
of the Ohio River, west of Pennsylvania, and east of the Mississippi
River became a territory of the United States.29 This land became the
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of
Minnesota east of the Mississippi River. 30 Congress adopted ordin-
ances to provide a structure of government for the newly acquired
territory, and to find balance between the Eastern states and the
Western states. 31 The Northwest Ordinance, also referred to as the
23 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3
24 Id; see also Loewen. supra note 1.
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight. but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Im-
portation. not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.").
26 FERDINAND LUNDBERG. CRACKS IN THE CONSTITUTION 213 (1980).
27 c id.
28 WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS: DRED SCOTT'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 147-
49 (1979); see also KATZ, supra note 13, at 75.
29 Northwest Territory in 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 795 (15th ed. 2002).
30 See e.g., id. at 797.
" Id. at 795.
4
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Ordinance of 1787,32 resulted in the division of the region into five
states, and made allowances for the Western states to eventually have
membership in the Union. 33 This piece of legislation would later
serve as a model for all other states that would later join the Union.34
Arguably, it would come to be one of the most important laws
adopted by the early settlers and government of the new nation. 35
The Ordinance of 1787 not only governed the Northwest Ter-
ritory, but also provided a platform for social and political democra-
cy. 36 The prohibition of slavery in these states was one issue openly
addressed in this platform. 37 This strengthened the Union states that
were antislavery. 38
B. The Missouri Compromise of 1820
The Missouri Compromise of 1820 addressed the regulation
of slavery, particularly in the western portion of the United States that
was developing beyond the original colonies. 39 This agreement,
passed by Congress, regulated the extension of slavery in the United
States for thirty-seven years. 40 It too fell victim to the Supreme
Court's decision in Dred Scott.41 In the years before the passing of
the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the North experienced a popula-
tion growth.42 This growth created a disparity of power between
32 Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1787).
33 See id.
3 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 795 (15th ed. 2002).
35 See Jack T. Eblen, Origins of the United States Colonial System: The Ordinance of 1787,
51 Wis. MAG. OF HisT. 294, 303-04 (1968).
36 Id.
37 See Northwest Ordinance. 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 334, 343 (1787): Eb-
len. supra note 35. at 310.
3 See Douglas R. Hurt. Historians and the Northwest Ordinance. 20 W. HIST. Q 261, 270
(1989); see generally Peter S. Onuf, Northwest Ordinance and Regional Identity, 72 Wis.
MAG. OF HiST. 293 (1989).
3 Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
40 Missouri Compromise, 3 Stat. 545 (1820). The Missouri Compromise passed in 1820 and
was repealed by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott in 1857, thirty seven years later. Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1957)
41 Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
42 KATZ, supra note 13, at 23; Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN LAW 88 (Matthew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005). Due to the lack of formal record
keeping, it is unknown exactly how many immigrants arrived in the United States between
1790 and 1820. Estimates approximate that roughly a quarter of a million people made the
voyage from the Old World to the New World. Settling in the ports of the cities where they
2011] 381
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slave and free states in the House of Representatives, though the Se-
nate remained evenly balanced. 43 During this period, Missouri ap-
plied for statehood in the Union.44 Missouri's entrance would have
allowed the slave states to procure a majority in both houses. 45 Si-
multaneously, the free territory of Maine applied to join the Union.46
Missouri's supporters used Maine's application as leverage to garner
anti-slave votes in Congress for Missouri's admission.47
Representative Henry Clay of Kentucky, a slave state, served
as Speaker of the House. 48 Seeking to maintain a balance between re-
presentation of free states and slave states in the Union, Clay was
adamant about and confident with the bargain he presented to the
Northern states. 49 Clay assured the Northern states that Maine would
only gain admission to the Union as a free state if Congress did not
circumscribe Missouri's rights as a slave state. 50 Clay successfully
persuaded the anti-slavery states to refrain from completely banning
slavery in the Maine and Missouri territories.51 This effectively pro-
hibited slavery in the northern half of Missouri, 52 but slavery still ex-
isted south of the "line of 36 0 30' north latitude" in the territory of
the Louisiana Purchase. 53
landed, many newcomers became residents of Baltimore, Boston. New Orleans. New York
City. and Philadelphia.
43 Missouri Compromise of 1820. in 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
44 Id.; PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 8
(1997).
45 Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
46 Id.; William R. Johnson. Prelude to the Missouri Compromise: A New York Congress-
man's Effort to Exclude Slavery from Arkansas Territory, 24 ARK. HiST. Q. 47. 64-65
(1965).
47 See Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 88
(Matthew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
48 1 CARL SCHURZ, LIFE OF HENRY CLAY 126 (1893).
49 Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
50 id.
Id.; SCHURZ. supra note 48, at 179.
52 Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545, 548 § 8 (1846).
SId. ("And be it further enacted, that territory ceded by France to the United States under
the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north lati-
tude, not included within the limits of the state contemplated by this act, slavery and invo-
luntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the parties shall have
been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby. forever prohibited. Provided always, that any
person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any state
6
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In 1821, before the final approval of Missouri's application
for statehood, Missouri inserted a provision into its constitution pro-
hibiting free blacks and "mulattoes" 54 from entering the state.s
Northern representatives objected, refusing to grant final approval to
Missouri's application unless Missouri removed the provision. 56
Representative Clay once again mediated the dispute, resulting in a
second compromise that removed the discriminatory provision.57 In-
stead, the Missouri constitution contained language prohibiting Mis-
souri from discriminating against citizens from other states.s The
new provision was included in the Resolution Providing for the Ad-
mission of the State of Missouri into the Union. 59 Subsequent to the
provision change, Congress admitted Missouri and Maine to the Un-
ion.60 However, the Resolution did not define who was a citizen,
leaving only the implication that such a definition did not include
Blacks. 61
The admission of Maine as a free state and Missouri as a slave
state preserved the political balance amongst the states, evenly distri-
buting slave and free states in the Union.62 Moreover, although the
or territory of the United States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to
the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.").
54 EBONY, supra note 12, at 109 10. The forbidden intermingling of blacks and whites
produced important codes in defining who was a slave and who was free. Id. This wide va-
riety of codes was most confusing. It was imperative that a black produce "freedom papers."
Id. If not. he or she would be presumed a slave. Id. The status of a mulatto would usually
be determined by the status of the mother of the child. Id. Thus, if the mother was a free
person, then the child was a free person. Id In Alabama, a mulatto was any "person of
mixed blood, descended, on the part of the mother or father, from Negro ancestors, to the
third generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation may have been a white
person." Id. In Virginia. on the other hand, a law decreed. "every person who has one-
fourth part or more of Negro blood shall be deemed a mulatto as well as Negro." Id. More-
over, in Kentucky. possessing less than a fourth of African blood was "prima facie evidence
of freedom." Id.
5 Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005); Mo. CONST. OF 1820, art. III, § 26, available at
http://clio.missouristate.edu/ftmiIler/localhistory/docs/moconstI 820.html.
56 Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
57 id.
58 Id.
59 RESOLUTION FOR THE ADMISSION OF MISSOURI (1821), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 226, 226 (William MacDonald ed.,
1905).
60 Missouri Compromise of 1820, in 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (Mat-
thew C. Cordon et al. eds., 2005).
61 Id. at 89.
62 Missouri Compromise of 1820. 3 Stat. 545 § 8 (1846); LUNDBERG. supra note 26, at 213.
2011] 383
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slave-opposing Northern states would still outnumber the Southern
states in the House, in the Senate there still existed a balance of vot-
- 63ing power.
The Supreme Court would rule this compromise unconstitu-
tional in Dred Scott.64 In the decision, Chief Justice Taney would
reason that the Missouri Compromise violated the Fifth Amend-
ment65 regarding property rights afforded to citizens of the United
States.66 He would also rule that blacks were not citizens of the Unit-
ed States, which is likely the interpretation Missouri intended.67
C. The Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854
The Missouri Compromise diffused the conflict enough to
postpone further development between the warring parties for the
next thirty years, 68 and only two states entered the Union during that
time.69 However, the expansion of the western territories ended this
temporary resolution. 70 Northern congressmen sought to pass legis-
lation to prevent the growth of slavery in the expanded western terri-
tories. Eventually, Congress passed the Compromise of 1850, a se-
ries of laws that once again addressed the issue. 72 The Compromise's
goal was to preserve the Union.73 It included a fugitive slave law, as
well as provisions denying those recognized as slaves a jury trial and
the right to testify on their own behalf. 74 Furthermore, it allowed sla-
63 Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545 § 8 (1846); LUNDBERG, supra note 26, at 213.
64 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
65 U.S. CONST., amend. V. ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia. when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put injeopar-
dy of life or limb: nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life. liberty, or property. without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
66 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
61 Id at 406.
68 The Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act, PBS.coM,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2951.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
69 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 9.
70 FINKELMAN, supra note 44. at 9: The Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act, su-
pra note 68.
71 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 9. A new prohibition led by northern congressmen, known
as the Wilmot Proviso, ultimately failed.
72Id.; The Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act, supra note 68.
73 The Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act, supra note 68.
74 Fugitive Slave Act 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850): FINKELMAN, supra note 44. at 9. The Fugi-
tive Slave Law of 1850 pleased the South but was met with resistance by the North.
8
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very in most of the territories acquired in the Mexican-American
War. This included territories that prohibited slavery as recognized
by the Missouri Compromise of 1820.76
Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, on the
heels of the Compromise of 1850.77 This Act repealed the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 with respect to those territories west of Mis-
souri.78 It did not mandate slavery's establishment in these territo-
ries, but instead permitted "popular sovereignty."79 Northerners op-
posed this, believing that the increased growth of slavery would
ultimately decrease the presence of free labor in the North.so In re-
sponse, Northerners formed the Republican Party. Ultimately, the
practice of popular sovereignty would lead to bloodshed as suppor-
ters of slavery in the South and opponents of slavery in the North bat-
tled for territorial rights in the Kansas territory. 82
IV. THE DRED SCOTT CASE
A. The Facts of the Case
Common law allowed any person held in wrongful enslave-
ment-who traveled legally into free territory-to sue for freedom. 83
Even Southern courts had held that the essence of the legislation was
75 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 9. The Compromise of 1850 allowed California to enter the
Union as a free state, but allowed slavery in the rest of the territories acquired in the Mex-
ican-American War. Id.
761d. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 allowed slavery in territories acquired in the Mexican-
American War, including territories recognized by the Missouri Compromise of 1820 as
non-slavery territories. i.e.. north of the 36E 30' line. Id.
n The Kansas-Nebraska Act, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
7 Id.; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 9-10.
79 The Kansas-Nebraska Act, 10 Stat. 277 (1854); FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 10. The
concept of "popular sovereignty," as articulated by Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois,
was the belief that Congress should permit settlers of a territory to decide independently
whether to adopt slave territory. Thus, settlers who wanted slavery could bring their slaves
into the territory. FINKELMAN. supra note 44. at 10.
80 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 10.
81 Id.
82 Id.; The Kansas- Nebraska Act, THE HISTORY PLACE,
http://www.historyplace.com/lincoln/kansas,htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). (As the vi-
olence in the battling of the territorial status grew, the death toll rose, which led to the Kan-
sas territory earning the nickname "Bleeding Kansas.").
83 Missouri's Dred Scott Case, 1846-1857, MISSOURI DIGITAL HERITAGE
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"once free, always free-even if you returned to slave territory." 84
Both the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Missouri Compromise
of 1820 supported this limitation.85 The Dred Scott case began when
the Missouri slave traveled with his owner, Dr. Emerson; 86 first to Il-
linois and then to a fort in the northern part of the Louisiana Purchase
designated a free territory by the Missouri Compromise. Upon re-
turning to Missouri, Scott sued for his freedom.88 Before filing suit
to liberate his family, Scott had made other attempts to gain their
freedom. 89 Once he fled to the Lucas swamps, a haven for slave ru-
naways near St. Louis, Missouri.90 Scott even attempted to purchase
his family's freedom by offering his master $300 as a down payment
for his family's freedom, which his master rebuffed. 91
B. Trial and Appellate History
Dred Scott's suit appeared to fall squarely under accepted
precedent. 92 His attorney argued that Scott was a free man because
he had ventured into free territory. 93 Throughout the course of
Scott's litigation, Sandford's counsel would provide shifting argu-
ments in opposition to Scott's claim for freedom. Initially, Sandford
brought up the element of consent, 94 arguing that although the
Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise granted freedom
to slaves who traveled into free states, the slave owner must have
consented to the travel. 95 Sandford's lawyer asserted that because
Dr. Emerson traveled into free territory with Dred Scott to report to
84 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE, ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 54-55 (1978); see FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 21 22.
8' Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545 (1820): Northwest Ordinance. 1 Stat. 50
(1787).
86 MissouRI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83. Dr. Emerson served as an assistant surgeon
in the United States Army. In November 1833, he and Dred Scott traveled to Fort
Armstrong, Illinois. This assignment would last for three years.
8 Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545 (1820); EBONY, supra note 12, at 237.
88 KATZ, supra note 13, at 75.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9 Id.; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 19.
92 Id. at 20 22 (citing Winny v. Whitesides. 1 Mo. 472 (1824) (holding a slave who had been
taken to Illinois was free); Somset v. Stewart, I Lofft (G.B.) 1 (1772) (holding slave status is
unnatural and thus can only be created by legislation); The Slave, Grace, 2 Hagg. Admir.
(G.B.) 94 (1827) (setting precedent not followed in the South)).




Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 15 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/3
DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD
his military assignment in Illinois, it was not of his free will.96 Addi-
tionally, Sandford's attorney further argued that because Emerson
traveled into military jurisdiction, military law prevailed over civil
anti-slavery laws, 9 7 and thus the laws that Scott relied upon were in-
appropriate and inapplicable. Ironically, Sandford's attorney did not
question the constitutionality of these laws-the crux of Chief Justice
Taney's decision-during the course of trial. 98 Sandford's counsel
made this claim only when the case went to the Supreme Court of
Missouri. 99 Nevertheless, the issue of constitutionality would be the
turning point of Scott's case once it reached the United States Su-
preme Court. 00 Here, the case would go from a "routine" suit for
Scott's freedom to "whether Congress had the authority to prohibit
slavery through legislation. 101
In April 1846, Dred Scott filed a petition to sue for freedom in
St. Louis Circuit Court based upon "an action of trespass for false
imprisonment."1 02 Originally, Scott brought his suit for freedom
against his late owner's wife, Irene Emerson.103 On June 30, 1847,
the lower state court ruled in favor of Mrs. Emerson, based upon a
technicality, never addressing the "once free, always free" argument.
104 In December of 1847, the judge granted Scott a new trial. 05 In
the second trial, Scott's attorney offered clear testimony to clear the
technicality of proof of ownership.106 As a result, the jury found for
96 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 84, at 240. "Meanwhile, Dr. John Emerson of St. Louis had
been trying to obtain an appointment as assistant surgeon in the United States Army. In De-
cember 1833, Emerson received his commission and reported for duty at Fort Armstrong in
Illinois. He took with him a Negro slave who had previously been the property of Peter
Blow and who is known in history as Dred Scott."
97 MissouRI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83; FEHERENBACHER, supra note 84, at 252, 256.
This argument offered by Emerson's attorney disregarded the precedent set by Rachael v.
Walker, 4 Mo. 350 (1836). Rachael was a slave held by an officer at military posts located
in Illinois and on the Wisconsin side of the Mississippi. The court ruled in Rachael's favor
stating that although the defendant had been required to stay at the military posts, "No au-
thority of law or the government compelled him to keep the plaintiff there as a slave." Ra-
chael. 4 Mo. at 352. 354.
98 MIssouRI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83.
99 Id.
00 Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401 (1857).
101 MISSOURI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83.
102 MIssoURI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83.
103 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 84, at 249-50.
104 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 21.
1os Id.
06 FEHRENBACHER. supra note 84, at 256.
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Dred Scott and his wife, Harriet Scott.107 Mrs. Emerson's attorney
appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which reversed the lower
state court's decision with a two-to-one vote against Scott.10s The
appellate decision ignored the precedent case law and existing legis-
lation that supported the lower court's decision.109
Dred Scott's attorneys filed a suit in federal court in 1854, re-
fusing to accept the decision handed down by the Missouri Supreme
Court. 110 At this point, Irene Emerson's brother, John Sandford, had
taken ownership of the Scotts, and the Scott's two daughters had in-
tervened as appellants."' On appeal, Scott lost again,112 and he filed
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.113 Almost two
years following the federal court's decision, in February of 1856 the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case. 114 However, in
May of 1856, the Court postponed its ruling and instead called for the
case to be re-argued in December of that same year.115 In March of
1857, the Court issued its opinion, in favor of Sandford.1 6 As far as
the courts were concerned, the Scotts could not be free." 7
C. The Court's Ruling and Reasoning for Its Decision
The Supreme Court ruled that Scott was not a citizen of the
United States and that the Missouri Compromise violated the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution because it interfered
107 Id. at 257.
108 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 84, at 264; MISSOURI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83.
109 MISSOuRI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83.
110 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 23, ("By 1854, when the case reached the United States
Circuit Court in St. Louis, Charles Edmund LaBeaume, a brother-in-law of Peter Blow's
sons. was renting the Scotts. The Blows had grown up with Scott (their father was his first
owner) and were deeply involved in helping him gain his freedom. LaBeaume in fact was
instrumental in helping Scott obtain the services of Roswell Field, a Vermont-born lawyer
with strong antislavery convictions. Field brought the case into federal court for one simple
reason - to win Scott's freedom. Dred Scott sued John Sandford in the United States Circuit
Court for battery and wrongful imprisonment.").
.. Id. at 23. 23 n. 28.
112 FINKELMAN. supra note 44, at 26: MissouRi DIGITAL HERITAGE. supra note 83.
..3 Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396 (1857).
114 FENKELMAN. supra note 44, at 27. The appellate briefs and oral arguments focused on
three factors: first, whether blacks could be citizens of the United States; second, whether
Congress possessed the power to prohibit slavery in the territories; and third, Whether the
Missouri Compromise was constitutional.
1 Id. at 27-28.
6 Id. at 454.
7 Id. at 452.
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with a citizen's right to own property. Though they could have
decided Dred Scott's case without addressing the constitutional is-
sues, Taney was determined to discuss the status of slavery in the ter-
ritories and the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.119 In
its ruling, the Court did not only rule against Scott's freedom, but it
also precluded any restrictions Congress may have attempted to place
on the expansion of slavery.120 Essentially, Taney stated, blacks "had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect."1 2 1
D. Issues before the Court
Ultimately, the Court does not speak to the legality of the
"once free, forever free" doctrine.122 Instead, the Court addressed
whether a "Negro of African descent could be a citizen of the United
States," as well as whether the Missouri Compromise was unconstitu-
tional in view of the Fifth Amendment.123 The precise questions pre-
sented were: "1. Whether Dred Scott was a citizen of Missouri and
thus entitled to sue as a United States citizen; 2. Whether Dred
Scott's stay on free soil had given him a title to freedom even upon
his return to Missouri; and 3. Whether the Missouri Compromise of
1820 was constitutional."1 24
1. Whether Dred Scott was A Citizen of the United States of America
If it were determined that Dred Scott was not a citizen of the
United States, then he would be unable to file suit in federal court be-
cause only citizens maintained the right to file to do so.125 In the
opinion Taney wrote of blacks as "inferior ... with no rights which
the white man was bound to respect."1 26 Taney believed that the is-
sue was "whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be
emancipated, or born of parents who had become free before their
birth, are citizens of a state, in the sense in which the word citizen is
''
8 Id. at 451-52.
119 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 36.
120 KATZ, supra note 13. at 75.
121 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393. 407 (1857); KATZ. supra note 13. at
75; MISSOURI DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83, at 15.
122 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 84, at 54-55.
123 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. at 403 (1857).
124 LUNDBERG, supra note 26, at 213-14.
125 Id at 214.
126 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
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used in the Constitution of the United States."1 27 Taney reasoned in
his opinion that the word "citizen" and the term "people of the United
States" were synonymous.128 Taney did not believe that Scott, and
those like him (slaves or ancestors of slaves) were included under the
term "sovereign people," or under the word "citizen" as used in the
Constitution.129 Thus, he concluded that they could not claim any of
the rights and privileges provided by the Constitution.130 Taney be-
lieved that this non-recognition of citizenship reached even states that
chose to give a resident slave "the character of citizen, and to endow
him with all its rights."1 3 1 Taney wrote that such a person "would not
be a citizen in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution
of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of its courts,
nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other
States." 132
2. Whether Dred Scott's Stay on Free Soil Had Given Him Permanent
Freedom
Dred Scott argued, pursuant to statute1 33 and case precedent 34
that he became a free man once he entered free territory,135 and that
even if he returned to slave territory, he retained his freedom. 13 6 Ta-
ney did recognize in his opinion that Emerson took Scott to Illinois, a
free territory.137 However, Taney relied on a Strader et al. v. Gra-
ham, which made a distinction between what laws controlled in such
a situation-the laws of the free state that the slaves visited or the
laws of the slave state that the slaves returned to following their vis-
it. 138 Based on that case, Taney concluded that even though Illinois
was a free state, upon Scott's return to Missouri, a slave state, Scott's
127 Id. at 403.
128 Id. at 404.
129 Id.
130 Id.
13 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405.
132Id.; See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 2.
'33 See generally Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545, §8 (1846): Northwest Ordin-
ance.
134 FEHRENBACHER. supra note 84 at 54-55.
135 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
13 6 id.
137 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
138 Id.; Strader v. Graham 51 U.S. 82, 83, 94 (1850) (holding that the status of the individuals
involved depended upon the laws of Kentucky, the territory they returned to. and not that of
Ohio, the free state they had visited.).
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status was not depended upon the laws of Illinois, but rather the laws
of Missouri. 139
3. The Constitutionality of Missouri Compromise
The constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise was the
third issue the Court addressed.140 Taney reasoned that slaves were
the property of their owners.141 Moreover, the government could not
deny owners their right to this property.142 Any legislation Congress
passed that injured the rights of the property owner would be in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment,143 which recognized a property owner's
rights of due process.144
Dred Scott supported his suit for freedom by relying on the
Missouri Compromise. 145 Taney questioned whether Congress could
pass such legislation under any of the powers granted to it by the
Constitution; if not, he reasoned, the Court had to "declare it void and
inoperative."1 46 Taney stated that the Constitution affirmed the right
of property in a slave; and furthermore, the owner had the right to
carry the slave like any other piece of property. 147 Taney concluded
that any congressional legislation that prohibited a citizen from hav-
ing slaves in territory north of the line drawn by the legislation was
unconstitutional and void.148 Thus, Dred Scott and his family could
not prevail under this argument.149
In ruling against Dred Scott and his family, the Court declared
unconstitutional any current or future legislation restricting the
growth of slavery. 50 Chief Justice Taney's personal ownership of
"' Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
140 Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545, §8 (1846); LUNDBERG, supra note 26, at 214.
141 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 425 (1857).
142 Id. at 450.
143U.S. CONST., amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
144 id.
145Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat. 545, §8 (1846).
146Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432 (1857); CUSHMAN & KONIAK, supra
note 10, at 129.
147 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 451; CUSHMAN & KONIAK, supra note 10, at 130.
148 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
149 id.
"o KATZ, supra note 13. at 75.
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slaves may have influenced his opinion. His personal belief that
the black man was inferior and his overall ideology brought "slavery
politics" into the Court. 152
V. INFLUENCE OF THE DRED SCOTT DECISION
Many thought that Taney had gone too far, and without cause.
First, the dissenting opinions referenced the Constitution's mandate
that "Congress was ... empowered under Article IV, Section 3, Pa-
ragraph 2, to regulate slavery in the territories." 153 The Missouri
Compromise clearly fell under the parameters of this provision, mak-
ing it a constitutional exercise of Congressional power. 154 Second,
the Court could have avoided any political issues had it followed its
ruling in Strader v. Graham.55 The Court ruled that every state pos-
sessed the authority to decide the status of all people within its bor-
ders; therefore, "Northern states could free visiting slaves, but the
Southern states had complete discretion to decide for themselves if a
slave who had lived in the North had become free."156 Furthermore,
once Taney made his ruling arguing that blacks-free or enslaved-
"could never be citizens," and did not have the right to sue, many ar-
gued that there was no need for him to address the Missouri Com-
promise.157 Once the Court concluded that Scott lacked the standing
to sue, the Court "should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion."158 Some would argue that all Taney wrote in the Dred Scott
opinion addressing the Missouri Compromise was dicta. 159 Neverthe-
less, the Court had ruled.160
15' Id.
152 Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857).
1 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 536: see also U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 3
154 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432.
15 Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 82-83 (1851) (holding the laws of Kentucky alone could
decide upon the domestic and social conditions of the persons domiciled within its territories
except so far as the powers of the States in this respect are restrained or duties and obliga-
tions imposed upon them by the Constitution of the United States); FINKELMAN. supra note
44. at 31.
56 Paul Finkelman. Scott v. Sandford: The Court's Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed
History, 82 Cm.- KENT L. REV. 3. 33 (2007).
157 Id. at 38.
15 Id. at 38.
159 Id. (Many Republicans argued that notwithstanding the Court's ruling in Scott v. Sand-
ford, the right to prohibit the practice of slavery in U.S. territories was retained by Congress
because all discussion of the congressional power over slavery in the territories was dicta.).
160 Finkelman. supra note 156, at 38.
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A. The Press, the People, and the Politicians
The sound of Taney's gavel echoed across the nation. Repub-
lican newspapers immediately brought news of the decision to print,
along with their own critical opinions of the ruling. 161 Abolitionists
voiced their fury over the opinion.162 However, Frederick Douglass,
an abolitionist and former slave, expressed optimism, believing that
Taney's decision would help to prevent the expansion of slavery and
eventually end it.163 Northerners were fearful of the potential loss of
jobs for white men because of the expansion of free labor, a problem
they had not contended with since slavery ended in the North.164 In
addition, politicians responded to the Dred Scott decision. Politicians
were uneasy that it would rupture the balance of power in Congress,
affording more to the South.165 Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Doug-
las used the decision to build support for their mutual positions in the
upcoming election for the U.S. Senate, as well as the subsequent
presidential nomination and election in 1860.166 Lincoln and Doug-
las usually addressed the Dred Scott decision during their debates.167
Lincoln invoked it to cultivate belief in a conspiracy theory that the
South planned to expand slavery throughout the entire nation, includ-
ing new territory and territory that was currently free. 168 Even before
the Court announced its decision, Lincoln publicly spoke against the
unethical relationship between Chief Justice Taney and President-
elect Buchanan-referring to a brief dialogue shared between the two
men immediately before Buchanan's inauguration address. 169 In that
speech, Buchanan had called for the nation's support of the Court's
decision. 170 Additionally, Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln's political ri-
161 Id. at 12.
162 Id. at 12-13.
163 EBONY, supra note 12, at 237; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 175; FINKELMAN, supra note
156, at 48.
164 KATZ, supra note 13. at 12-13. Although at one time slavery was also present in the
North, it began to disappear as early as 1777 in Vermont. concluding in New York in 1817.
"In 1795 President John Adams thought that the opposition of white mechanics concerned
over losing jobs to black slaves was most important." Id.
165 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 184-185.
166 Id.
167 H. L. POHLMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE IN ACTION 48 (2d ed. 2005).
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val and presidential opponent, continued to defend the Dred Scott de-
cision throughout the 1858 senatorial campaign.
Despite his purportedly unbiased role as Chief Justice, Ta-
ney's goal in Dred Scott was political rather than legal. 172 A slave
owner himself, Taney saw the case as an opportunity to declare that
Congress lacked the power to ban slavery from the U.S. territories,
thus, slavery could expand unabated by Congress.173 Buchanan, who
was pro-slavery and pro-South,174 also sought finality regarding the
issue of slavery. Buchanan considered slavery in the territories to be
a "judicial question"-he openly stated that the issue was one for the
Supreme Court to decide, and that he looked forward to a speedy set-
tlement of the issue, along with acceptance of the decision once deli-
vered.175 To both men's dismay, the Dred Scott decision would pro-
vide the fuel for political debate during the campaigns of 1858 and
1860.176
1. Reactions from Newspapers
Newspapers responded to Taney's decision by using the pow-
er of print to deliver Taney's opinion to the masses.177 The New York
Tribune circulated Taney's opinion, along with Justice Curtis' dis-
sent, in the hope of promoting the Republican cause to prohibit the
extension of slavery into new territories. 178 Its editor, Horace Gree-
ley, equated the validity of Taney's decision to an opinion made in a
"Washington barroom."l79 Another Republican newspaper, the Chi-
cago Tribune, called Taney's views regarding the status of blacks as
non-citizens as "inhuman dicta."180 Still other newspapers supported
Taney's decision. The Richmond Enquirer praised the Court's de-
cision and saw it as an end to the debate over slavery.182 The New
Orleans Picayune found favor with Taney's opinion, telling its read-
17 1 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 184.
172 Finkelman, supra note 156, at 43.
173 See id.
174 FINKELMAN. supra note 44, at 133.
175 Id. at 45: Finkelman. supra note 156, at 45.
176 FINKELMAN. supra note 44, at 168-169: Finkelman, supra note 156, at 45.
177 See Finkelman, supra note 156, at 45.
1 Id. at 12.
179 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 145; Finkelman, supra note 156, at 12.
180 Finkelman, supra note 156, at 12.
1 See FINKELMAN. supra note 44, at 128.
182 id.
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ers that the Court and the Constitution supported the South's
cause.183
2. The Public's Stance
The opinion discouraged most abolitionists and Northern-
ers. 184 Abolitionists regarded the ruling as "open advocacy of slavery
by the United States Supreme Court."185 Republicans feared that the
ruling-that Congress did not have the power to prohibit slavery-
called into question the legitimacy of their core issue.' 86 Outside ab-
olitionist circles, many Northerners did not support slavery because
expansion of slavery meant the threat of jobs belonging to white
men. 1 European immigrants who had settled in the North now felt
threatened by the potential that their jobs would go to slaves who had
to work without pay, if slavery expanded to northern territories.188
However, not all Northerners disliked slavery.189 There were those
who profited by supporting the "practice of the South."1 90 Though
Northern states had outlawed slavery within their borders, some
Northern businessmen did not relinquish their part in the slave
trade. 19 1 They comprised the majority of the owners and captains of
the ships involved in the African slave trade. 192 Northern factories
produced the tools of bondage used to hold Southern slaves.193 New
England industry was profitable and powerful because of the African
slave trade and the business conducted with Southern slave own-
ers.194
Most Northern supporters of the Court's decision based their
support on racism, party affiliations, and commercial concerns. 195
1s3 Id.
184 See Finkelman, supra note 156, at 5.
185 EBONY supra note 12, at 237; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 184.
186 ERIC H. WALTHER, THE SHATTERING OF THE UNION IN THE 1850s 122 (2004).
187 KATZ, supra note 13, at 12.
18 Id. at 79.
"




193 KATZ, supra note 13, at 12 (quoting Daniel Webster: I hear the sound of the hammer, I
see the smoke of the furnaces where manacles and fetters are forged for human hands." Da-
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Most whites, from the North and the South, did not believe in racial
equality, but instead believed in white superiority. 19 6 Members of the
Democratic Party wanted to end the issue of slavery and pursue their
agenda of settling in the Western territories and increasing their polit-
ical power.197 Northern businessmen were concerned with the na-
tion's economy. 198 They supported the Dred Scott decision, hoping
that it would assist in the preservation of national commerce by end-




The Dred Scott decision profoundly influenced the political
careers of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas. 200 During their
famous debates, the Dred Scott decision was a core issue. 201 They
opposed each other in the 1858 U.S. Senate race, and two years later
the men would once again face each other in a run for the presiden-
cy.202 Douglas defended and provided support for Taney's decision,
while Lincoln attacked and opposed the ruling. 203 The debates would
prove to be very instrumental in the outcome of both elections. 204
Douglas defined his position on slavery before the Dred Scott
decision.205 In 1850, Douglas was instrumental in getting Congress'
approval of the Compromise of 1850,206 and he sponsored the Kan-
207
sas-Nebraska Act of 1854. Douglas believed that the adoption of
slavery in a territory should be left up to the settlers of that territory; a
concept known as "popular sovereignty." 208 These two pieces of leg-
islation, along with Douglas' support of the Dred Scott decision, pro-
vided Lincoln with ammunition to support his theory that Southerners
and supporters of slavery were planning to nationalize slavery
19 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 136; Loewen, supra note 1.
197 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 136.
198Id. at 137.
199 Id.
200 FINKELMAN. supra note 44, at 168.
201 id.
202 Id. at 202.
203 Id. at 168.
204 Id. at 202.
205 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 84, at 178.
206 Id. at 161, 178.
207 The Kansas-Nebraska Act. 10 Stat. 277 (1854), FEHRENBACHER, supra note 84, at 179.
208 FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 10.
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throughout the Union. 209 Fellow Democrats in both the North and
the South joined Douglas as he supported and endorsed the Court's
decision that Blacks, even those who were free, could never be Unit-
ed States citizens. 2 10
On January 6, 1859, Douglas defeated Lincoln and was re-
elected to represent the state of Illinois in the Senate.211 His en-
dorsement of Dred Scott was likely instrumental in this win. Howev-
er, although some Democrats succeeded in the congressional elec-
tions, northern Democrats did not fare well.212 The main results from
this reelection were a split in the Democratic Party, a decline in
Democratic poll power in crucial northern states, and the election of a
Republican president in the 1860 election. 2 13
Douglas campaigned for political office by insisting that all
citizens of the United States defer to the Court's decision; that it was
their duty to support this decision.214 In one of the debates, Lincoln
contemplated the possibility that the Court could reverse itself if
faced with another plaintiff similarly situated to Dred Scott. 215 In his
response to Lincoln, Douglas stated, "Mr. Lincoln intimates that there
is another mode by which he can reverse the Dred Scott decision.
How is that?" 2 16 Ironically, such a reversal would happen-not via
"mob law," 217 as Douglas asserted during the debate, but rather
through proclamations and amendments to the United States Consti-
218tution.
The course of Lincoln's political future would dramatically
change following the Dred Scott decision. Even before Taney issued
his ruling, Lincoln considered the potential impact it would have on
public policy.219 During his political campaign for both the Senate
209 Id at 46.210 Id. at 49.
211 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 84, at 501.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 503.
214 FINKELMAN. supra note 44, at 198-199.
215 Id at 204.
216 Id at 207.
217 1d at 51.
218 EBONY, supra note 12 at 275; HARVEY FIRESIDE, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 116 (2004).
219 DRED SCOTT, MR. LINCOLN AND FREEDOM,
http://www.mrlincolnandfreedom.org/content inside.asp?ID=1 5&subjectlD=2 (last visited
Sept. 22, 2011). In January 1857, as he prepared for a speech, Lincoln wondered what
would be the impact of the Dred Scott decision. In his notes, he concluded "that so soon as
the Supreme Court decides that Dred Scott is a slave, the whole community must decide that
2011] 397
21
Jackson: Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Prelude to the Civil War
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2011
398 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XV:2
seat and the presidency, Lincoln openly articulated his opposition to
the Court's decision. 22 0 He continued to promote, whether he be-
lieved it or not, the notion that the South and supporters of slavery
were conspiring to extend slavery throughout the Union.221 In his
Speech on the Dred Scott Decision, Lincoln spoke of the historical
factual errors that Taney had made in the opinion.222 He also ad-
dressed Taney's incorrect assumption that public opinion of Blacks
had become more favorable than at the origin of the government of
the United States.223 However, although Lincoln opposed Taney's
decision, Lincoln was steadfast in his stance regarding racial amal-
gamation.224 In his speech addressing the Dred Scott decision, Lin-
coln did express that the Court should have recognized Dred Scott
and his family as citizens and given them at least a hearing.225 How-
ever, Lincoln also made his views on race mixing very clear, stating:
I have said that the separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of
amalgamation. I have no right to say all the members of the Republican party
are in favor of this, nor to say that as a party they are in favor of it. There is
nothing in their platform directly on the subject. But I can say a very large
proportion of its members are for it, and that the chief plank in their plat or-
opposition to the spread of slavery-is most favorable to that separation.
In his interpretation of the Constitution and its application to slavery,
Taney would "stretch the text to fit his southern prejudices," 227 "and
rule African Americans out of the Constitution." 228 However, Ta-
ney's opinion was unable to put an end to the slavery debate. The
Dred Scott decision "exacerbated sectional tension, infuriated most
northerners, helped set the stage for Lincoln's election to the presi-
dency in 1860 and surely brought the nation closer to civil war." 229
In accepting his nomination as the Republican candidate for the Se-
nate, Lincoln delivered his "House Divided" speech, in which he ad-
dressed the issue of slavery:
not only Dred Scott, but that all persons in like condition, are rightfully slaves." 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 388 (Roy P. Basler 1857).
220 FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 46, 47.
221 Id. at 46: WALTHER, supra note 186, at 151.






227 FIRESIDE, supra note 218, at 117.
228 Id. at 221.
229 Finkelman. supra note 2. at 50.
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A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot
endure, permanently half slave and halffree. I do not expect the Union to be
dissolved- I do not expect the house to fall- but I do expect it will cease to be
divided. It will become all one thing. or all the other. Either the opponents of
slavery, will arrest the further spread of it. and place it . .. in [the] course of ul-
timate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall m ome alike
lawful in all the States, old as well as new- North as well as South.
Throughout the course of his campaign for the Senate and presiden-
cy, Lincoln continued to speak against the infamous Dred Scott deci-
sion, construing it as the most important case on race relations before
the Civil War.23 1
Although Lincoln's views on race may have been more pro-
gressive than most at that time, he did believe that Blacks and Whites
were different.232 In a speech given in Illinois in 1858, Lincoln spoke
to the audience about these perceived differences. 233 He stated,
"There is a physical difference between the white and black races liv-
ing together on the terms of social and political equality. He, as a
white man, favored, "having the superior position assigned to the
white race." 234 Even before issuing the Emancipation Proclamation,
Lincoln demonstrated his commitment to segregation by defending
the deportation and colonization of slaves. 235 Despite popular con-
ception of Lincoln's goals, it is a myth to say that Abraham Lincoln
fought to free the slaves. Lincoln did not oppose slavery in a va-
cuum, but rather wanted to preserve the Union.236 He knew that
without putting an end to the inevitably contentious and geopolitical-
ly divisive issue of slavery, the Union, along with the political power
of the northern states, would be lost.237
Just as Lincoln knew slavery to be the crux of the conflict be-
tween the North and South, it also provided him with a weapon to use
against the region after the war began. As the nation grew, the
Southern economy remained almost entirely agricultural, unlike the
heavily industrialized North, and it relied on slavery to support this
230 WALTHER. supra note 186, at 151: Finkelman, supra note 2, at 47. Abraham Lincoln.
Speech at Illinois Republican Convention. (Jun. 16, 1858) available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4h2934t.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
23 'Finkelman. supra note 156, at 46-47 (2007).
232 Id. at 131.
233 Id.
234 KATZ, supra note 13, at 77.
235 EBONY, supra note 12, at 271; KATZ, supra note 13, at 77.
236FIRESIDE, supra note 218, at 32: KATZ. supra note 13, at 78; Loewen, supra note 1.
237 FIRESIDE. supra note 218, at 32, 33.
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system.238 To emancipate the Southern slaves would entail a collapse
of much of the Southern commercial system, which then depended
upon the existence of slavery. 239 If the North could accomplish this
mission, it could hobble the South economically as well as militari-
ly. 240 Thus, President Abraham Lincoln had both political and mili-
tary reasons to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. 24 1 The Eman-
cipation Proclamation's purpose was to strengthen the Union as much
as it was to aid the slaves.242 Nowhere is this more evident than in a
letter Lincoln had written to Horace Greeley, editor of the New York
Tribune,243 in which he stated:
If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could
save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing
some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slve y.
and the colored race. I do because I believe it helps to save the Union ....
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that Dred Scott appreciated the level of signific-
ance of his signature-the letter "X"-on his suit for freedom in
April 1846.245 The Supreme Court's decision in his suit would cause
fiery political consequences as bitterness and hostility fomented be-
tween the North and the South.246 Taney's Dred Scott decision
promised the growth across the nation of the cancer created by sla-
very.247 As supporters of slavery lauded the Court's decision, Nor-
238 KATZ, supra note 13, at 3.
239 Loewen, supra note I ("Its labor supplies the product which constitutes by far the largest
and most important portions of the commerce of the earth. .. . A blow at slavery is a blow at
commerce and civilization." Mississippi Secession Declaration (Jan. 9. 1861) available at
http://www.civil-war.net/pages/mississippi declaration.asp (last visited Oct. 18. 2011)).
240 WILLIAM J. COOPER. JR., & THOMAS E. TERRILL. THE AMERICAN SOUTH: A HISTORY 375
(2009); Frederick J. Blue, Constitutional and Political Factors, in THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR: A HANDBOOK OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 134 (Steven R. Woodworth, ed., 1996).
241 Emancipation Proclamation, (Jan. 1, 1863) available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured documents/emancipation proclamation/transcript
.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011): EBONY, supra note 12. at 268, 272.
242 EBONY. supra note 12, 271, 272; KATZ supra note 13. at 78.
243 KATZ, supra note 13. at 77.
244Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of United States, to Horace Greeley, Editor. NEW
YORK TRIBUNE, SPEECHES & WRITINGS, available at
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/greeley.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2011).
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therners and abolitionists expressed their fury, recognizing the far-
reaching impact of Scott's denial of freedom.
Since the war's end, many have tried to recast the conflict as a
battle for states' rights, or against tariffs and taxes. 248 However, no
historical wallpaper can obscure the fact that the South's burning de-
sire to defend the preservation and expansion of slavery was its pri-
mary motivation to secede from the Union. 249 Slavery supporters be-
lieved that secession would not only maintain the system of slavery,
but would also propagate the South's ideology of white suprema-
cy.250 The anti-slavery movement's compromise on geographic limi-
tations on slavery was an attempt to elide moral and political fault
lines existing at the formation of American society and written into
its founding legal principles. The Dred Scott case unforgivingly re-
vealed those fault lines, ratcheting up the intensity of the conflict be-
tween the North and South. It exposed a nation that was unequivo-
cally moving toward civil war.
Dred Scott and his family did ultimately get their freedom,
through extra-judicial forces. 2 51 The Scott family found emancipa-
tion at the hands of Taylor Blow, a descendent of Scott's original
owner.252 However, Scott's legal quest for freedom, a journey that
lasted over a decade, "forced the nation to directly confront sla-
very" 253 and its evils. The Dred Scott decision laid bare the legal sys-
tem's inability to solve such a deeply embedded problem. In ruling
that all Blacks were not and could not be citizens of the United
States, Dred Scott set the stage for the Civil War. 254
248 Loewen, supra note 1.
2 49 id.
2 50 id.
251 KATZ, supra note 13. at 76.
252 MISSouRi DIGITAL HERITAGE, supra note 83. Irene Emerson's husband was an abolition-
ist. When her husband, Dr. Calvin Chaffe, learned that his wife owned Dred Scott, he trans-
ferred ownership of the Scott family to Taylor Blow. Blow lived in St. Louis; Missouri law
only allowed a citizen of the state to emancipate a slave there. Mrs. Irene Emerson Chaffee
made the transfer, but only if she would receive the wages that were earned by the Scotts
over the years. She received about $750, which ironically was probably about $50 more
than had she sold them on the slave market. Id.
253 KATZ, supra note 13. at 76.
254 FINKELMAN. supra note 44, at 2.
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